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Community level Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) has become one of the most rapidly 
growing fields of counterterrorism in the past few years (Malkki, 2016: 342). For example, in 
2015 the UN Secretary-General highlighted the role of local actors, including municipalities 
and civil society in the implementation of effective prevention programmes (United Nations, 
2015). This means that local actors, including politicians, can exert greater control over the 
practices. However, PVE policies have already been criticized for involving too many actors, 
which confuses the overall goals (Briggs, 2010). Hence, the increasing plurality of 
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Abstract 
In 2015 and 2016 two interesting cases occurred in Denmark regarding practices 
related to Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE): a community-level dialogue was 
discontinued with an extremist milieu in Copenhagen due to the specific 
worldview but allowed to continue in a similar situation in Aarhus. What were the 
reasons for this divergence? When examining the community-level political 
argumentation, an exclusion paradigm played a crucial role, but other factors, such 
as confusion about the core concepts and goals of PVE, the political dynamics at 
play, and the prevailing decision-making structures also influenced the differential 
outcomes despite the similarity of the situations. Since community-level PVE 
practices constitute a rapidly growing field, there is a lesson to be learned from the 
Danish cases: building coherent and continuous PVE practices is not only a matter 
for professional practitioners, but also calls for a solid understanding of its goals at 












practitioners and relevant decision makers is not necessarily a good development regarding 
the coherence and continuity of PVE. Two interesting cases from Denmark, a lead country in 
Europe for the prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization initiatives, demonstrate the 
possible political challenges that the community focus might entail in that a differential 
political-level understanding on PVE led to two different outcomes in communal-level 
practices in the cities of Aarhus and Copenhagen. As a result of preaching and supporting 
Sharia law, the dialogue with a radical milieu in Copenhagen was halted in November 2015. 
However, a similar dialogue continued in Aarhus despite scandals arising out of comments in 
favour of violence against women, or hailing Danish foreign fighters in Syria as heroes. This 
article analyzes the political background that led to the differential outcomes by addressing 
several pertinent questions. What type of political argumentation emerged, what kind of logic 
was it based on, and which other political factors played a role? Furthermore, what is the 
significance of the two cases in the wider framework of community-level PVE?   
One of the reasons for the differential outcomes in Aarhus and Copenhagen was that 
the community-level political systems were different. Aarhus has one mayor with relatively 
broad power, whereas in Copenhagen the power is more de-centralized. This made Aarhus 
more resistant to political change, at least in the studied case, since the mayor stood behind 
the PVE practices despite the scandals. However, focusing on the political argumentation, it is 
apparent that there were similarities in both cities. The so-called exclusion paradigm was the 
most relevant of these, referring to the willingness to exclude unwanted factors from society 
instead of trying to remedy them (e.g. Koskela, 2009: 39-40). The paradigm itself is common 
in politics, so this begs the question of whether there was a relevant factor in the Danish PVE 
approach that rendered it vulnerable to politicking. Addressing this question calls for a focus 
on the community-level PVE itself. From the point of view of this article, there are two issues 
that PVE practices have been criticized for in other contexts. First, since the authorities are 
also communicating through their actions, targeted PVE may create “suspect communities”, 
thereby adding to the societal grievances instead of mitigating them (Spalek and Lambert, 












complicated and even controversial (Coolsaet, 2012: 240). Both of these issues seemed to 
play some role in Denmark, but differently from the way they did in other contexts.   
The present analysis is structured as follows: First the Danish approach to community-
level PVE is briefly introduced, followed by an overview of the existing literature on PVE 
and the applied methodology. After that, the selected cases from Copenhagen and Aarhus are 
described focusing on the political argumentation. The findings are then discussed in the light 
of the wider PVE context. Although few conclusions can be drawn from the two cases, they 
are nevertheless relevant. First of all, the Danish cases underline the importance of solid 
political backing for PVE practices. Hence, when granting local ownership of PVE, it is 
essential to ensure that the overall goals are fully understood. Second, while the Danish state 
can naturally defend core democratic values and promote them, it is questionable whether this 
should be done in the framework of PVE. Ultimately, a value-based PVE approach securitizes 
differential values. 
 
Community level PVE in Denmark  
 
Denmark has been in the vanguard of European community-level preventive policies and 
practices since EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove designated Denmark 
as the lead country in the prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization initiatives in 2008, 
only one year after the so-called Aarhus model was launched (Lindekilde, 2015). Danish 
PVE-practices were inspired in part by the British programme, and in part by a similar 
programme in the Netherlands (Crone and Nasser, 2018: 12). This allowed the Danes to take 
into account some of the criticism that the British policies had faced, primarily regarding the 
problem with creating suspect communities, which will be discussed below. After the Aarhus 
success story in 2014, whereby the flow of volunteers to the Civil War in Syria and Iraq was 
halted (Skjoldager and Sheikh, 2014), the Danes started to export the model to other countries 













The main innovation in Aarhus was establishing so-called info houses, which was the 
name given to the local cooperation network between the Security Intelligence Service PET 
(national agency), the police district (regional), and the municipalities. When necessary, the 
network also includes relevant local professionals, such as teachers, mentors, social workers, 
and networks for other purposes, such as crime prevention, psychiatric health care, and prison 
and probation services. All in all, the approach places very strong emphasis on the local level, 
PET being the only national agency involved (Hemmingsen, 2015). The rationale for the 
model was to build bridges across different administrative sectors both horizontally and 
vertically, and to share information among professionals who might each know relevant 
pieces of information. Collecting data from different sources helps PET to draw a complete 
picture. Due to the appraised successes in Aarhus, similar info-houses have since been 
established in all twelve Danish police districts. 
The info-house system is primarily used for the so-called short-term approach, which 
generally refers to action targeted at extremist groups and individuals, their operations, 
motivations, ideologies, potential targets, strategies, and organization structures, in order to 
prevent violent action from taking place (Crelinstein, 2009: 45-46). However, the Danish PVE 
also includes a long-term approach, namely social, political and economic policies at the 
national, regional, and local levels aimed at diminishing societal breeding grounds for 
fragmentation, confrontation and marginalization. At the community level one of the core 
measures is to promote dialogue between different local actors, entities, and groups. However, 
dialoguing with all extremist milieus is not a widespread practice in Denmark, since the 
Danish approach does not regard religion as a root cause for radicalization (Crone and Nasser, 
2018: 14). Consequently, many of the religious communities have deliberately been left out of 
the PVE networks, although some local authorities, like those in Copenhagen and Aarhus, 
have engaged in dialogue with religious figures and mosques.  
The roots of the differential approaches are linked to the dual agendas of the Danish 
action plan: protection of the state and society against terrorist attacks, and the welfare state’s 












requires some explaining. In the 2016 action plan it was specified that one of the goals is to 
prevent the rise of “parallel societies” and to protect the “freedom, democracy, security and 
self-determination of the people” (Regeringen, 2016: 3). The dual agenda strongly links 
Danish PVE to the European school of thought in countering terrorism, which sees a link 
between violent ideologies and action, underlining efforts to counter and prevent both 
(Neumann, 2016: 886-887). Even though the Danes have tried to downplay the role of 
religion in the process of radicalization, the 2016 action plan explicitly points out that the 
Danish government has taken several measures in order to control Islamic preaching and 
indoctrination (Regeringen, 2016: 25). 
 
Previous research on community level PVE and its challenges 
 
The history of PVE as a special policy branch under the umbrella of counterterrorism can be 
traced to the aftermath of the 2005 London terrorist attacks, when the British government 
launched the Pathfinder projects, the aim of which was to encourage local authorities to 
engage with Muslim communities in order to build collective resilience and social cohesion 
(Lowndes and Thorp, 2012: 123-124). The rationale for the local focus stemmed from the fact 
that terrorists are well integrated into local networks, and communities may be able to act as 
an early warning system for the police and intelligence services (Briggs, 2010: 971-981). 
Since the UK was the first country in Europe with a special policy programme on PVE, it is 
natural, that most of the research on PVE is also related to the British practices. Despite the 
growing interest in the Danish model, there has been surprisingly little research on the PVE 
practices in Denmark. The most prominent research has been conducted by Danish 
researchers themselves, such as Lasse Lindekilde and Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, whose 
works have been used as sources for this article. The same scarcity of research applies to the 
politics or political argumentation related to PVE. This is also somewhat surprising since, as 
described below, PVE practices have been criticized precisely on account of their political 












In order to analyze the impact of the political argumentation in the wider framework of 
PVE, it is necessary to introduce the two most relevant challenges that PVE practices have 
encountered according to researchers. Perhaps the most significant criticism levelled at PVE 
practices is that they have turned Muslim communities into “suspects” (e.g. Spalek and 
Lambert, 2008; Kundnani, 2009; Lakhani, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2012; Mythen and Walklate, 
2017). Hence, if clumsily planned, the practices can actually reinforce the Islamist threat by 
privileging the Muslim faith identity and antagonizing Muslims instead of mitigating the root 
causes of radicalization (Thomas, 2011: 168-186). This has been the case in the UK, 
especially when PVE practices were first introduced. Hence, many countries, Denmark 
included, have tried to avoid this. Nonetheless, practices can de facto turn Muslim 
communities into suspects, as a study on Amsterdam, Berlin and London argues (Vermeulen, 
2014). This criticism is linked to strategic communication. For example, as early as 1982 
Schmid and de Graaf claimed that terrorism is a specific form of political violence due to its 
communicative character (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982). This leads to the conclusion that 
counterterrorism is also communicative. As Spalek and Lambert argue, hard policing tactics 
can have a negative impact on discourse (Spalek and Lambert, 2008). Furthermore, Beatrice 
de Graaf has suggested that the adapted counterterrorism measures are linked to the general 
perception of the state that executes those measures, and therefore one cannot separate 
communication from action (de Graaf, 2011: 8-9). Through PVE practices, the government is 
effectively securitizing its targets, irrespective of whether if they are individuals, milieus, 
communities, or values.  
Another relevant issue that PVE has been criticized for is that the practices are 
developed without a clear understanding of how the actual process of radicalization – namely 
becoming a violent actor – occurs (Ranstorp, 2009). Furthermore, the core concepts in 
strategy papers are often poorly defined, complicated and even controversial (Coolsaet, 2012: 
240). This applies to the Danish approach too. The 2016 Danish national action plan is 
focused on preventing and countering radicalization and extremism, to which end it also 












legitimise violence or other illegal acts, with reference to societal conditions that they 
disagree with”, and radicalization to the process whereby persons “subscribe to extremist 
views or legitimise their actions on the basis of extremist ideologies” (Regeringen, 2016: 7). 
These definitions reflect the common understanding of the terms quite well, but the Danish 
definition of extremism is interesting, because it also links extremism to legislation, not just 
the use of violence. By defining any breaches of the law in the framework of an ideology as a 
form of extremism, one could also regard non-violent civil disobedience and ideology-based 
tax evasion as forms of extremism. It is not clear whether this was the idea behind the Danish 
definition of extremism or not, but the conceptual fuzziness is not a matter of mere academic 
hair-splitting. It can have a direct bearing on the adopted measures and target of an action. If 
the goals of the action are unclear or incoherent, even controversial action is likely to ensue. 
Different actors involved in PVE often have different raisons d’être. Police officers might see 
the action as protecting society, whereas a youth worker might try to prevent adolescents from 
making deleterious life choices. For example, in the UK, PVE has been criticized for funding 
projects whose aims are not clear, fostering the perception that the approach is a mere “spying 
tool” for the security authorities (Briggs, 2010). 
 
Research material and method  
 
This analysis is based on open source information. The material is mostly sourced from 
Danish print media coverage on the political debates and public outcry related to radical 
preaching in Aarhus and Copenhagen, and the stances that were taken vis-à-vis the 
community-level dialogue with the radical milieus in question. Political statements, 
discourses, and stances were clearly represented from the national level down to the local 
levels in the two cities. Politiken, Berlingske, Jyllands-Posten and Information were among 
the most important Danish news sources accessed for the purposes of this study. 
Regarding the state-level strategy on PVE, the most important primary sources are the 












National handlingsplan) from 2014 and 2016, which describe the official concepts and PVE 
policy at the time when the dialogue debacles were taking place, as well as the official goals 
of Danish CVE and PVE. Secondary material on the “Danish approach” has also been used in 
order to obtain a clear picture of the PVE processes in Denmark, such as the aforementioned 
research studies by Lindekilde and Hemmingsen.  
Since the focus was on political argumentation, relevant questions pertain to the kind 
of arguments that were presented, the logic behind them, and the relationship with either the 
radicalization process, extremism, terrorism, dialogue, or values. This argumentation was then 
analyzed bearing in mind the policy goals in the official strategies and the PVE challenges 
that previous research has identified in other contexts. Only the qualitatively representative 
arguments are presented in this paper. It would have been interesting to focus  on the 
politicking that took place behind the scenes as well, namely the way in which politicians and 
PVE officials interacted and the kind of powerplays that were conducted, if any. This was not 
possible within the framework of this research, however. Although the selected cases 
furnished a rather limited amount of data, it was nonetheless sufficient to raise some relevant 
questions on the role played by politics in successful PVE. Yet it must be recognized that 
much more profound research from other cases would also be necessary in order to draw more 
conclusive findings.   
 
Dialoguing with extremist milieus: Copenhagen vs. Aarhus 
 
The question of dialoguing with extremist milieus has been politicized in Denmark every time 
it has been publicly acknowledged that they do indeed espouse an extreme worldview that  
includes justifying violent measures. This revelation has duly been greeted with a public 
outcry and political demands to end the dialogue forthwith. In this article the focus is on two 
religious milieus in particular: 1) Copenhagen and the Islamic religious community (Det 












introduction, in Copenhagen the dialogue was halted in November 2015, whereas in Aarhus 
the dialogue continued.  
One of the practical reasons for the heated debate over dialogue is the impact of the 
Syrian civil war and the phenomenon of foreign fighters joining the so-called Islamic State 
terrorist organization, who might pose a terrorism-related security threat upon their return 
home (Lindekilde, 2015: 440). As explained below, this is especially true in the case of 
Grimhøj, which has been one of the most important hubs for Danish volunteers for Syria. In 
this context, the debate is linked purely to PVE and counterterrorism, since it mainly concerns 
radicalization and the role of radical milieus in the radicalization process. However, the 
debate is also associated with larger themes such as what the official stance should be on 
(religious) conservatism and whether society should tolerate subcultures and ideologies that 
are in stark contrast to the core values of Danish society, especially regarding the role of 
women. In addition to drawing ideological and value-based frameworks, the debate is also 
related to defining the physical space and boundaries for those subcultures in Denmark, which 
implies a debate on the role of Islam, and on whether new mosques and preaching sites can be 
built and, if so, where, when, and by whom. Hence, the debate on dialogue with radical 
milieus is profoundly connected to the core values and boundaries in Danish society, and thus 
the dialogue cases are in essence politically sensitive.  
 
The Copenhagen municipality and Det Islamiske Trossamfund (DIT) 
The dispute between the Copenhagen municipality (Kommune) and DIT goes back a number 
of years. The deepest grievance was related to the infamous Mohammed cartoon episode in 
2005, when a delegation from DIT travelled to the Middle East and North Africa in order to 
disparage Danish society and freedom of speech, which was instrumental in facilitating the 
internationalization and escalation of a political crisis that had serious implications for 
Denmark as a whole (Holm, 2006). Other cases causing discord have been related to 
controversial imams whose preaching gives rise to scandalous headlines, or other related 












notorious for his adulation of Osama bin Laden, acceptance of violence against women and 
alleged hate speech against Jews, was invited to Copenhagen in 2015. An example of the 
latter concerned a case from 2013 when DIT’s youth organization, Munida, claimed in a 
YouTube video that watching the TV show The X Factor was haram, namely a forbidden 
deed.  
The politicking against dialogue with DIT reached a peak in the autumn of 2015 when 
Copenhagen’s local Social Democrats, Venstre, the Liberal Alliance and Conservative 
politicians reached a consensus on ending the dialogue within one month if DIT refused to 
distance itself from controversial manifestations (Bjørnager, 2015a). At the time of the 
ultimatum, Copenhagen municipality and DIT were involved in dialogue through three 
projects: 1) the Viden Inklusion København network against the radicalization of young 
people, where DIT’s youth organization Munida was included but did not show up at 
meetings; 2) the Civil Society Group, which provides input for experts on radicalization 
prevention, where two representatives from DIT have been active; and 3) Copenhagen’s 
Board for Integration and Citizenship (Integration og Medborgerskab) (Lauritzen, 2015). 
The reason for issuing an ultimatum to DIT was not because of an isolated incident, 
but on account of the accumulation of various polemical cases in relation to the Islamic 
organization. The decision was not unanimous, however. For example, Anna Mee Allerslev 
(Radicale Venstre), the Copenhagen Mayor for Employment and Integration Administration 
(Beskæftigelses- og Integrationsforvaltningen), said in an interview that one should not pit 
“hard against hard” and give up on dialogue, not least because it would be important to keep 
an eye on any “new Omar El-Hussein2” (Dahlgaard and Jensen, 2015).  
In response to the political pressure, DIT’s press representative claimed that “because 
of the threats and demands in the media, there is very little that dialogue can achieve”, and 
that distancing oneself from the alleged radical stances would be akin to admitting that DIT 
adopted such stances (Bjørnager, 2015b). As DIT did not bend, on 12 November 2015 the 
Copenhagen Municipality Council (Borgerrepræsentation) decided that the cooperation with 
                                                 












DIT would not continue. Thirty voters among the Social Democrats, Venstre, the Liberal 
Alliance and the Conservative Folkeparti were in favour of ending the dialogue, as opposed to 
23 council members who were against the decision (Melander, 2015).  
 
Aarhus and the Grimhøj mosque  
Another “hotspot” embroiled in the debate on engaging in dialogue with extremist milieus is 
the second biggest city in Denmark – Aarhus. The municipality of Aarhus has had different 
types of PVE practices since 2007, including, for example, enhanced cooperation with local 
authorities and civil society actors, exit programmes, mentoring, and anti-discrimination 
campaigns (Lindekilde, 2015: 432-433). Despite the wide spectrum of different preventive 
measures, in 2014 it was revealed that 22 out of some 90 individuals that had travelled from 
Denmark to take part in the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq had set out from the networks of 
the Grimhøj mosque (Sheikh, 2014)3. Furthermore, the chairman of the Grimhøj mosque, 
Oussama El-Saadi, had allegedly hailed one of the Danish volunteers that had killed himself 
in a suicide terrorist attack as “a hero” (Rask Mikkelsen, 2014). As a consequence, a heated 
debate was ignited on preventive measures, especially on engaging in dialogue with the 
critical religious community in Grimhøj. 
In a similar vein to the occurrences in Copenhagen, political Conservatives in Aarhus 
started politicking in favour of zero tolerance towards radical ideology and called for an end 
to the dialogue. A representative of the Dansk Folkepartiet, Pia Kjærsgaard, said that it was 
“absurd” that East Jutland’s police were claiming to be engaging in a good dialogue with the 
mosque at the same time as its leader was talking up the war (Rask Mikkelsen, 2014). A very 
similar statement was issued by Marc Perera Christensen (Conservative People’s Party), who 
said in a TV2 interview that it was “very problematic to cooperate with someone who thinks it 
is heroism to become a terrorist and a suicide bomber” (interview cited in Rask Mikkelsen, 
2014). However, the politicking had little effect in this case. Only a couple of months later, 
the dialogue with the Grimhøj mosque was cast in a completely different light when the 
                                                 












chairman of the mosque, Oussama El-Saadi, said in a press conference that due to cooperation 
with the police and good dialogue, the flow of foreign fighters from the mosque’s networks 
had ceased (Skjoldager and Sheikh, 2014). Consequently, the Aarhus policies received a great 
deal of international attention as a PVE success story. Seven months later, in February 2015, 
the Mayor of Aarhus, Jacob Bundsgaard (Social Democratic Party), gave a presentation at a 
White House Summit, making the “Aarhus model” world famous in the process. 
Understandably, the debate on dialogue subsided for a while, although the Dansk Folkepartiet 
strove to keep the topic on the agenda by demanding that the mosque should be closed down 
altogether (Jørgensen, 2015). 
The debate on dialogue heated up again in spring 2016 when a TV2 series of 
documentaries entitled “Moskeerne bag sløret” (Mosques behind the veil) revealed radical 
preaching taking place in the Grimhøj mosque, namely comments in favour of Sharia law, 
violence against women, the death penalty for homosexuality, and so on. As a consequence, 
politicking against the mosque started up again. Some demanded strict control over 
municipality money allocated to cooperation with the mosque (Ritzau, 2016), whereas more 
Conservative voices again called for the mosque to be closed down completely (Mather, 
2016). However, the outcome of the debate was that no major changes would be made, but 
rather that they would occur in the margins of the existing policies. The main argument 
against ending the dialogue and closing the mosque was summed up by Lene Horsbøl 
(Venstre): “In Aarhus, we have this thing called the Aarhus model, which means that we 
count on cooperation. That goes for the Grimhøj mosque as well. I believe more in dialogue 
and open cooperation, where we tell each other if there is something that we disagree upon” 
(Mather, 2016).  
In response to the political grievances, on 8 March 2016 the Mayor of Aarhus 
published a 10-point plan for fighting radical Islamism (Haislund and Hvid, 2016). Ideas 
included certifying imams, providing help for women to extricate themselves from abusive 
relationships, better monitoring of ethnic minorities to ensure that girls would be given equal 












and the Conservative People’s Party were dubious about the plan, particularly in respect of its 
timing after the documentary, even though they had tried to put the issue on the table many 
times before that. For example, Venstre’s leader, Bünyamin Simsek, said that his party had 
reiterated warnings about the emerging “parallel society” long before the documentary, but 
that the mayor had not heeded the warning. This was echoed by Conservative leader Marc 
Perera Christensen, who said that the Social Democrats with their “socialist partners” had 
“not been able to handle the issue in the past 30 years” (Haislund and Hvid, 2016). 
 
Discussion: Political challenges in a key role 
 
The cases of Copenhagen and Aarhus demonstrated three principal challenges at the political 
level that may cause differential outcomes for PVE practices at the community level. First, 
one must take into account different local political structures. Copenhagen has an elected 
government where several “mayors” – who are similar to ministers in a state-level system – 
have considerable autonomy to move around. In Aarhus there is one mayor, who heads the 
municipality. Consequently, Copenhagen is more exposed to party politics, and Aarhus more 
resistant to change, while the mayor stays the same. In Copenhagen, party politics bypassed 
the goals of PVE, whereas in Aarhus the PVE practice was renowned, and the mayor stood 
behind it. Hence, the practices had sufficient political backing in Aarhus at those times when 
the public outcry over radical preaching was most vehement. However, this difference does 
not wholly account for the outcomes because other political factors also played a role, as will 
be explained below. Nevertheless, the difference underlines an important lesson: successful 
PVE requires a good understanding of its role at all political levels. This lesson is even more 
relevant when bearing in mind that the current tendency is to increasingly emphasize local 
actors, including communities, in PVE.    
Second, the core concepts and strategic focal points of PVE posed some challenges, 
yet not in the most obvious way. The Danish action plan defines the core concepts otherwise 












Furthermore, the inbuilt dual agenda of the plan causes differential understanding of the goals 
of PVE. It is only natural that all political systems try to defend their core values. The same 
applies to Nordic welfare states that put a high value on civil liberties, equality, and social 
justice. Downplaying social grievances and polarization are normal activities of any welfare 
state. However, it is reasonable to question whether this should be done in the framework of 
PVE since it has great potential to securitize its targets. In other words, it runs a high risk of 
turning the targeted communities into suspect communities, or of perceiving certain values as 
a security threat even if the link to violence is not clear. Since the Danish approach is strongly 
value-based, it can be argued that in both Aarhus and Copenhagen the preventive practices 
had failed. Despite the fact that dialogue and cooperation had been ongoing for some years, 
radical milieus had formed, and they were still in evidence. Even the success in stemming the 
flow of volunteers travelling to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria can be criticized 
(Sheikh, 2015). Preventive measures have surely played a role in the decrease in volunteers, 
but it is likely that some external factors also diminished the interest in travelling, such as 
Islamic State losing ground, deaths of known foreign fighters, and infighting between the 
jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. These factors decreased the flow everywhere more or less at 
the same time, not only in Aarhus. However, existing extremist milieus should not pose a 
hindrance to the continuity of long-term measures, such as dialogue, at the community level. 
Those milieus are precisely the hotspots where constructive dialogue functions as a point of 
connection to society. Even if it does not succeed in preventing extremist thinking or bringing 
the milieu back to the mainstream, punishing the extremist milieu for this can serve as a 
critical marginalizing event, which can lead to further radicalization.   
While criticism is legitimate and necessary in order to improve practices, it also 
provided politicians with some arguments. This brings us to the third political challenge that 
the Danish cases demonstrated. In the cases under study one can observe a grievance in the 
understanding of PVE between politicians and practitioners. The plan itself tries to avoid 
pointing the finger at communities as suspects, but those politicians arguing against dialogue 












might be interested in securing their own success in the next election rather than backing a 
policy that might make them appear weak. They need visibility within the relatively short 
electoral time period and they have to make choices that are supported among their electorate. 
This easily leads to shortsightedness regarding the goals. Politicians want quick results. Some 
of the argumentation was also based on the traditional carrot-and-stick logic, where “good” 
behaviour is rewarded and “bad” punished, but perhaps more important than that was the 
existence of the so-called exclusion paradigm. The paradigm refers to a tendency to 
completely exclude unwanted and unpleasant factors – in this case the extremist milieus – 
from society instead of trying to remedy them. The paradigm is visible in several political 
sectors, not only in security politics. For example, one can demand that rehabilitation centres 
for alcoholics are not located in urban centres, children with special needs are not grouped 
with normal children at schools, and so forth (Koskela, 2009: 39-40). In both cases the 
exclusion paradigm was in the interests of the conservative political forces. In many ways, the 
paradigm is a natural expedient; since their aim is to maintain the traditional values of society, 
they are generally less tolerant of different values, and they often demand harder measures 
and punishments for those who contravene those values. 
The exclusion paradigm in Denmark was also linked to migration, not just extremism. 
In both cases it was a question of “foreign” extremism, which was relatively new in Denmark 
and prevalent among immigrants and people with migrant backgrounds. Since opposing 
migration is at the top of the agenda of present day neo-nationalist politics in Europe, 
Denmark included, questioning PVE was a populist move targeting migration rather than PVE 
as such. The goal of the politicking was to demonstrate to the conservative electorates that 
extremism – that is to say differential values – should not be allowed to flourish in Denmark. 
However, continuing dialogue with a counterpart that does not share your values does not 
imply that you accept, or even tolerate, those values. If political violence and terrorism are 
seen as a means of strategic communication (Crelinstein, 2009; de Graaf, 2011), then 
countering measures, including PVE, should bear in mind the communicative aspect of the 












followers and those audiences need to be taken into account. Every action or non-action is a 
message. Would the same politicians that argued against dialogue with DIT or the Grimhøj 
milieus haven gone to the same lengths to condemn more “domestic” forms of extremism, 
such as neo-Nazism, or anti-fascism? One cannot answer that question based on this study, 
but it is an important point to consider. If the exclusion is more evident regarding some forms 
of extremism than others, the practice becomes a form of discrimination and part of the 
problem instead of a solution. In sum, certain types of political argumentation are 
instrumental in themselves in creating “suspect communities”, and thereby in increasing 




One important conclusion that can be drawn from the cases in Aarhus and Copenhagen is that 
avoiding stigmatizing communities through PVE practices is a difficult, if not impossible task 
since PVE has great potential to securitize its targets. However, having a strongly value-based 
approach, as demonstrated in Denmark, may well amount to this. For example, guaranteeing 
that girls can go to schools, as the Mayor in Aarhus in his 10-point plan, should be a self-
evident policy in any Nordic country for a myriad of reasons that do not have anything to do 
with violent extremism. While any welfare state naturally endeavours to mitigate polarization 
and promote certain values, such as freedom, democracy, security and self-determination for 
its citizens, it is questionable whether this should be carried out in the framework of PVE at 
all because other values, even non-violent ones, can then be seen as a form of extremism, or 
in other words, as a security threat. 
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the two cases is that PVE 
practices can be vulnerable to several types of political arguments and demands, such as the 
exclusion paradigm, the stick-and-carrot –approach, or quick results. This is understandable to 
some extent, since one of the challenges of PVE is to prove that it actually works, and 












is often frustrating and may give the impression that the target of the action is merely abusing 
the goodwill of society, if there are no perceptible changes in the thinking. However, the 
political system itself can have a surprising impact on PVE if there is insufficient 
understanding of its relevance, or if the local political interests bypass the interests of the 
national strategy. It was because of these factors that the dialogue with an extremist milieu 
was discontinued in Copenhagen, whereas in Aarhus it continued in a similar situation. If one 
wants to tackle this issue, one must put effort into clarifying the core concepts, and 
guaranteeing sufficient political backing in the system. It will not suffice for practitioners 
alone to understand why it is important to engage extremist milieus in dialogue – local 
politicians need to understand its importance as well. Failing this, politics can become more 
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